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RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action filed by Plaintiffs sought to have a certain 
real estate contract entered into between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant J. B. Deliran rescinded and to recover from 
Defendants-Respondents J. B. Deliran, Gerald House and ERA 
Realty Center all payments made against the purchase price as 
agreed to between said parties. Plaintiffs' basis for seeking 
rescission was that a legal water connection did not exist on 
the property purchased by them. Defendant ERA Realty Center 
was joined as a party-defendant by Plaintiffs as the real 
estate agent and was rc>quirecl to remain in the J awsui t and 
defend its position even though the Court ruled as a matter of 
law that it was the agent of J. B. Deliran. It was, and always 
has been, the position of ERA Realty Center that it should not 
have been named as a party-defendant, that Plaintiffs• 
Complaint, Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint 
failed to seek any affirmative relief from said Defendant, and 
that by reason of the same, ERA Realty Center is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees under (1) the language of the Earnest 
Money Agreement and (2) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
78-27-56. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury over a period of three 
days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants to 
the effect that the contract entered into between Plaintiffs 
and Defendant cT. B. Deliran should not be rescinded. There-
after, the Court (sitting without a jury) awarded Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiffs against Defendants J. B. Deliran and Gerald 
House (not against ERA Realty Center) in the sum of $16,450.00 
for the reason that Deliran and House, as sellers, did not 
provide legal access to the subject property. The Trial Court 
so orderecl even though Plaintiffs' Complaint failed to state 
any claim for damages by reason of non-access. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs failed to move to amend their Complaint pursuant to 
Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure at any time 
concerning damages incurred by reason of non-access to the 
subject property. Absolutely no testimony was offered at the 
jury trial concerning non-access to the property. 
The Court also denied the request of all Defendants to an 
award of attorney's fees, even though they prevailed at the 
jury trial whereby the contract sought to be rescinded by 
Plaintiffs was in fact upheld. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant ERA Realty Center seeks to have the jury verdict 
affirmed and to reverse the District Court's Judgment denying 
an award of attorney's fees to Defendant ERA Realty Center, 
including attorney's fees rendered on appeal, and to remand the 
matter to the District Court for purposes of taking additional 
proof concerning attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 12, 1980, Daryl Yates and Marydon 
Yates, who were the then owners of the subject property, listed 
the same with ERA Realty Center with an asking price of 
$29,900.00 (Exhibit 1). Defendant J. B. Deliran purchased from 
Yates the subject property for the sum of $17,018.87 on April 
19, 1981, pursuant to an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 2). On May 15, 1981, J. B. Deliran 
listed the subject property with ERA Realty Center with an 
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asking price of $27,500.00 (Exhibit 4). The Yates 1 isting 
agreement states "water in building", while the Deliran listing 
indicates that city water is not available. Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Deliran entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement for the subject property on July 
16, 1981, with a purchase price of $23,800.00 (Exhibit 5). The 
closing of the transaction, however, did not take place until 
August 12, 1982. By reason of that sale, Defendant ERA Realty 
Center earned a commission which was paid at the time of 
closing. 
In February of 1981, and while the property was listed by 
Yates with ERA Realty Center, Appellant Andrew Acton inquired 
concerning the subject property, but did not purchase the same. 
At that time, Andrew saw the Yates listing agreement which 
stated "water in building." In June of 1981, and after the 
property had been purchased by J. B. Deliran and relisted with 
ERA Realty Center, Andrew again made inquiry, went to the 
subject property and observed water running from a frost-free 
spigot. The water from the spigot actually came from the 
adj a cent property owned by Wayne Smith. At some time in the 
past, the Smith water line had been extended underground to the 
subject property. Thereafter, and prior to closing, Plaintiffs 
again visited the subject property and were accompanied hy 
Robert Behunin, the Cedar City Building Inspector. While 
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Plaintiffs claim there is some dispute as to what Behunin told 
Plaintiffs concerning the availability of water, the record 
speaks for itself: 
Direct Examination of Behunin by Scott Thorley, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
Q. Okay. Did you have any conversations as you went 
outside the building concerning water? 
A. Yes. As we left the building, we were talking 
about water meters, and we vaguely looked for a 
water meter, we couldn't find one and I left and 
I stated if there wasn't a water connection, 
they'd (sic) have to pay for a connection. 
Q. Okay. And by that, were you referring to a water 
meter? 
A. Yes. A legal connection to the water system. 
Q. Did you ever tell these people that the water 
connection in this building was illegal? 
A. I don't know if I specifically told them at that 
time that the water connection in that building 
was illegal. I did tell them that I felt there 
wasn't a meter -- there wasn't a meter there, and 
they would have to pay for a connection. 
Q. And they'd have to pay for a connection and water 
meter? 
A. Right. (Tr. 408). (Emphasis added). 
Cross-Examination of Behunin by Hans Q. Chamberlain, 
Attorney for Defendant ERA Realty Center. 
Q. All right. Mr. Behunin, do you recall in your 
deposition, testifying that -- if there was a 
water meter there, that it would be out by the 
street, if not, then they'd (sic) have to go in 
and see Bud Bauer; did you tell --
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you testify? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you tell the Actons that on the occasion you 
visited the property? 
A. Yes. We -- that's when we were out in front 
talking about water meters. 
Q. That they needed to go in and see Bud Bauer? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 420). 
Bud Bauer was the Superintendent of the Cedar City 
Municipal Water System. 
The above quoted testimony is only one of many instances 
prior to closing where Plaintiffs became aware that the water 
flowing from the frost-free spigot on the property may not be 
coming from a legal water connection, and that they needed to 
make inquiry of Bud Bauer, the Superintendent of the Cedar City 
Water Department. Plaintiffs in fact failed to make inquiry of 
Mr. Bauer prior to closing as to whether or not the water 
connection was legal and what it would cost to purchase a water 
meter from Cedar City Corporation. 
Prior to closing, Plaintiffs engaged the services of David 
Grimshaw to survey the subject property. The survey prepared 
by David Grimshaw (Exhibit 6) makes reference to the location 
of a sewer connection, but fails to indicate that a water meter 
was discovered during the course of the survey work. The 
survey map was delivered by Grimshaw to Plaintiffs prior to 
closing. A review of the Grimshaw testimony clearly indicates 
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that Plaintiffs were put on notice by Wayne Smith, the owner of 
the water connection, that water did not go with the property, 
that the water connection belonged to him, and that they should 
make inquiry concerning the availability of another water 
connection. 
Direct Examination of David Grimshaw by Hans Q. 
Chamberlain. 
Q. How long were you on the property conducting this 
survey? 
A. Total, probably 4 hours. 
Q. And who assisted you on that day? 
A. Russell Acton. 
Q. All right. And he's the gentleman in the court-
room today? 
A. Yes. That's why the letter is addressed to 
Russell. 
Q. To Russell? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. On that day, did you see Mr. Wayne 
Smith? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know who Wayne Smith was before that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Were you present on that day at a 
time when there was a conversation between Mr. 
Wayne Smith and Mr. Act -- or Russell Acton, 
which you -- which you were a party to concerning 




Q. All right. And would ycu tell ll,;, Mr. Grimshaw, 
whose spoke and what Y.'as said 0t tl1:1l time? 
l\. Wayne Smith explained the water on the lot was i:ln 
illegal connection, did not_ th the lot. 
He explained other things rr1ti3ininq to the lot 
that he has already said here today. (Tr. 
486-487). (Emphasis added) 
Direct Examination (continued). 
Q. All right. What specificallv clicl he say, if you 
recall, to the best of your memory, concerninq 
water? 
A. I don't remember the exact words, other than he> 
clicl point out that the water clicl not go with the 
lot. (Tr. 488). 
Direct Examination (continued). 
o. All right. Now, I note in your lc>tter to Mr. 
Russell Acton elated August 1, 1981, that you do 
not state anything about water; is there a reason 
why you didn't put anything in concerninq the 
water? 
A. Because Wayne Smith had explained there was no 
water on the lot. 
Q. And he explained that to Russell Acton; is that 
correct? 
A. And to myself, yes. (Tr. 488). 
Mr. Wayne Smith owned the property adjacent to the subJect 
property and likewise was the owner of the wi:ltcr connection 
which extended off his line and onto the property in c1ueslion. 
(Tr. 467). Mr. Smith's testimony is cons1"tcrt \vit:h tl\at ot 
the testimony given by Mr. Grimshaw, hut is mnre 
explicit concerning the fact th,1t Plaintif'<; v:•-·re r•\lt on actual 
notice that the water clue not CJO with thr· !'rnp•·r t \'. 
testified that he was present when the property was being 
surveyed by Mr. Grimshaw on or about August 1, 19B1. (Tr. 
467-468). 
Direct Examination of Mr. Smith by Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
Q. All right. All right, and was there a 
conversation -- well, let me ask, what was (sic) 
Mr. Acton and Mr. -- Mr. Russell Acton and Mr. 
David Grimshaw doing? What did you observe them 
doing? 
A. They were trying to locate boundaries for the 
property where the lines were. 
Q. At that time, Mr. Smith, did you have a 
conversation with them or did you direct any 
conversation towards Mr. Russell Acton and in the 
presence of David Grimshaw concerning the water 
that was located upon the Yates property? 
A. We talked --
Q. Did you have a conversation? 
A. We talked about several things and I think the 
water was one we talked about, yes. 
Q. All right. And at the time you talked about the 
water, would you state in substance and effect 
what you said to Mr. Russell Acton in the 
presence of David Grimshaw concerning the water? 
A. Mentioned that the water, that particular hydrant 
on the property, that really it wasn't a legal 
connection. 
Q. Wasn't an -- wasn't a legal connection? 
Tl.. Right. 
Q. All right. And what else did you tell them about 
the water? 
Tl.. Basically, I -- we talked several times and they 
asked me some questions about where the water 
lines were at different periods, and I really 
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don't recall on any particular day, you know, it 
is my testimony; but what I did say, but what I 
did note it -- make note that thPre was a problem 
with the water connection. 
Q. What did you tell them the problem was? 
A. Well it wasn't metered, it came off our meter and 
it wouldn't be -- they couldn't continue to do 
that, it wasn't a le al connection to do that. 
(Tr. 468-469). Emphasis added). 
Mr. Smith, in response to cross-examination by Plaintiffs' 
counsel stated: 
Cross-Examination of Smith by Scott Thorley. 
Q. But what you're saying is that during one of the 
several conversations that you had, you discussed 
that the water wasn't metered going into the 
Yates property; is that correct? 
A. I told them it came across my ground and it 
wasn't a legal connection, they'd have to solve 
that. (Tr. 476). 
Both Mr. Grimshaw and Mr. Smith testified after Plaintiff 
Russell Acton had testified. Of significance is the fact that 
on cross-examination, Mr. Acton gave the following testimony 
before Smith and Grimshaw testified: 
Cross-Examination of Russell Acton by Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
Q. Let me do it this way, Mr. Acton: Do you deny 
that Wayne Smith told you on August 1, 1981, that 
the water connection was illegal? Do you deny 
that? 
A. I do not recall the conversation that it was 
illegal. 
Q. Don't recall it? 
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A. No sir. 
Q. Convenient memory? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Do you deny that Wayne Smith told you the water 
did not go with the property? Do you deny he 
told you that? 
A. I do not recall it. (Tr. 297-298). 
Even though Plaintiffs had been put on notice by Mr. 
Behunin and Mr. Smith that a leg a 1 water connection did not 
exist, Plaintiffs elected to close the transaction without 
making further inquiry. Only after the closing of the 
transaction did Plaintiffs make inquiry of Bud Bauer, the Water 
Superintendent for Cedar City Corporation. Mr. Bauer only 
confirmed what Plaintiffs had earlier been told by Mr. Smith, 
to-wit, that the water connection was in fact an illegal 
connection and that Plaintiffs could not continue to use it. 
Plaintiffs thereafter requested that the seller, J. B. 
Deliran, rescind the sale, but Mr. House, on behalf of said 
entity, refused to do so. Plaintiffs then contacted Audry 
Lebbon, the salesperson for Defendant ERA Realty Center to see 
what could be done. Nancy Hale, another salesperson for ERA 
Realty Center, was a participant in the conversation held at 
the real estate office and testified that since Mr. Behunin was 
a very efficient man, she couldn't imagine him not telling 
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3. For an Order of this Court suspending payments on lhe 
contract during the pendency of this action and 
thereafter. 
4. For the cancellation of said agreement to purchase. 
5. For an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
this lawsuit. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper. 
Defendant J.B. Deliran cross-claimed against ERA Realty 
Center requesting indemnifcation in the event the Plaintiffs 
prevailed. However, pursuant to the motion of Defendant ERA 
Realty Center, the Court severed for purposes of trial said 
Cross-Claim. Thereafter, Defendant ERA Realty Center moved to 
dismiss on the basis that ( 1) said Defendant was not a proper 
party to the action (2) that ERA Realty Center was the agent of 
the seller, J. D. Deliran and (3) that Plaintiffs had not 
alleged any legal theories which would make ERA Realty Center 
individually liable. That motion was denied by the Court over 
the strenuous objection of Defendant ERA Realty Center, and 
said Defendant was put to the expense of a three day jury trial 
when in fact no liability would have attached to ERA Realty 
Center if Plaintiffs had prevailed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The evidence clearly supports the jury verdict 
which specifically enforced the contract between 
the buver and the seller. 
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The primary issue of the three day jury trial was whether 
Plaintiffs had either actual or constructive notice that the 
property in question did not contain a legal water connection. 
Appellants would have this Court believe that the evidence is 
so overwhelming in their favor that to hold otherwise would be 
a manifest injustice. While Plaintiffs may have testified that 
they did not have notice of the defective water connection, the 
record is replete with testimony from independent witnesses 
which persuasively contradict that position. Russell Acton, a 
party litigant interested in the outcome of the litigation 
indicated on cross-examination that he could not recall 
statements made to him by Wayne Smith, in the presence of the 
surveyor, David Grimshaw, ( 1) that the water connection was 
illegal, (2) that the water connection belonged to Smith, and 
(3) that they (meaning Plaintiffs) would have to do something 
about it. Smith and Grimshaw were called as independent 
third-parties to describe a conversation which directly focused 
in on the issue of notice, both actual and constructive. Smith 
clearly testified that he told Russell Acton that (1) the 
hydrant (meaning the frost-free spigot) on the property wasn't 
a legal connection, (2) that there was a problem with the water 
connect ion, ( 3) that the connection wasn't metered, ( 4) that it 
came off Smith's meter and (5) that the Actons would have to 
solve those particular matters. (Tr. 469-476). David 
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Grimshaw, an individual hired by Plaintiffs to conduct a survey 
testified that Mr. Smith explained to Plaintiff Fussell Acton 
that the water on the lot was an illegal connection and "did 
not belong with the lot". (Tr. 4 8 7) . Furthermore, the 
conversation between Robert Behunin and Plaintiffs would have 
placed a reasonable man on constructive notice that there was a 
potential problem concerning the source of the water coming 
from the frost-free spigot for the reason that he told them 
there was no meter and that a meter must be purchased to 
establish a "legal water connection" (Tr. 408) 
For Appellant to state that none of the witnesses called 
by Defendant contradicted or rebutted the testimony of 
Plaintiffs is simply a misstatement of the facts. The 
testimony produced by Defendants not only rebutted the position 
maintained by Plaintiffs, but was so clear that a jury elected 
to accept the testimony offered by Defendants and reject the 
testimony of Plaintiffs. Such is the prerogative of a jury. 
II. The trial court properly refused to grant 
Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict 
or its motion for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 
In Utah the law is well estahlished that the trial court 
should only grant a directecl verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict when all of the h'st1mony and all 
reasonable inferences flowing thercfrnr1 which tend to prove 
Plaintiffs' case be accepted as true, and all ronflirts and all 
evidence which tend tu disprove it be disregarded. Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967). 
In the instant case, the Court simply recognized that 
while there was conflictina evidence, the credibility of the 
witnesses was at issue and that the trier of fact can choose to 
accept the testimony of one witness over the other. The 
testimony outlined above convincingly indicates that there was 
substantial evidence for the jury to find in favor of 
Defendants and against Plaintiffs. 
III. The Court erred in failing to award Defendant 
ERA Realty Center attorney's fees pursuant to 
the language of the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement. 
It is the position of Defendant ERA Realty Center that it 
was privy to the Earnest Money Agreement entered into between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant J. B. Deli ran, and by reason of the 
same, since the seller, J. B. Deliran, and its agent, ERA 
Realty Center, prevailed at the time of trial, they should be 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the defense 
of this action. The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 5) states 
at line 47: 
If either party fails so to do, he agrees 
all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or of 
any right arising out of the breach thereof, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. (Emphasis 
added) . 
It should be understood that Plaintiffs action sought to 
rescinrl the ('nnlroct. It is clear that had the jury rescinded 
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the contract as Plaintiffs alleged, Plaintiffs would not have 
been entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In BLT 
Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d, 456 (Utah, 1978), the 
Court adopted the position articulated in the case of 
Bodenhamer v. Patterson 278 Or. 367, 563 P.2d 1212 (Or., 1977), 
and stated: 
"Finally, Pattersons contend that the trial 
court erred in denying their request for 
attorney's fees. This was not error. The claim 
for attorney's fees is based upon a provision in 
the contract of sale. By asking for rescission 
of the contract they disaffirmed it in its 
entirety. They may not avoid the contract and, 
at the same time, claim the benefit of the 
provision for attorney's fees." (At page 458). 
By Plaintiffs attempt to rescind the contract, all 
Defendants joined by Plaintiffs were put to the test to 
specifically enforce the contract for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant J. B. Deliran wanted the contract 
specifically enforced so that the sale was completed and a 
profit made. 
2. Defendant ERA Realty Center wanted the contract 
specifically enforced since it earned a commission in handling 
the sale, and if the contract were rescinded by jury verdict, 
ERA Realty Center would have to return to J. B. Deliran the 
commission it made of ten percent of the sale price. (See line 
49 of the Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 5, which provides 
for a commission of 10%). 
1 8 
The Court ultimately ruled as a matter of law, and so 
instructed the jury, that ERA Realty Center was the agent of J. 
B. Deliran, and any act committed by ERA Realty Center was 
ultimately the act of J. B. Deliran. Therefore, for all 
intents and purposes, said Defendants became one and the same. 
Thus, if this Court finds that J. B. Deliran is entitled to 
recover its attorney's fees because it is a party to the 
contract, then likewise, Defendant ERA Realty Center, as its 
agent (but named as a separate Defendant by Plaintiffs) shall 
also be entitled to that same privilege. Furthermore, a review 
of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement 
indicates that ERA Realty Center signed the contract as the 
agent for J. B. Deliran. The signature of ERA Realty Center 
made it a party to the action for purposes of receiving a 
commission by bringing Plaintiffs and Defendant J. B. Deliran 
together. The very act by Plaintiffs in seeking to rescind the 
contract required ERA Realty Center to seek to enforce said 
contract so that it would ultimately receive the commission 
generated by the sale. 
The case of Usinger v. Campbell, 280 Or. 751, 572 P.2d 
1018 (Or. 1977), supports the position taken by Defendant ERA 
Rea 1 ty Center. In Usinger, 
the seller for specific 
the purchaser brought suit against 
performance of an Earnest Money 
Agreement. The lower court denied specific performance of the 
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contract and dismissed purchaser's complaiflt but awarded the 
seller, as the prevailing party, attorney's fees pursuant to 
the provision for such found in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
The court stated: 
Plaintiffs finally argued that Defendant 
should not have been awarded attorney's fees. 
The Earnest Money Agreement specifically 
provided for such fees. Plaintiffs argue, 
however, that Defendant "elected to rescind 
the Earnest Money Agreement," thus bringing 
the case under the rule of Pickinpaugh v. 
Morton, 268 Or. 9, 519 P.2d 91 (1974). 
PICkii1paugh is distinguishable from the case 
at bar. In that case Plaintiff came into 
court seeking a rescision of the contract. 
The tr ia 1 court al lowed re sci s ion and this 
court affirmed. We re lied upon 3 H. Black 
Rescission and Cancellation §583 ( 1960) for 
the proposition that Plaintiff could not 
assert that the contract should be rescinded 
and at the same time rely on a provision 
therein for the recovery of attorney's fees. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs contend there 
was a contract and asked for specific 
performance. This requires the Defendant to 
come into court and defend, also relying on 
the contract by stating that it was not 
performed in accordance with its terms. 
Defendant does not disaffirm the contract but 
relies on the exact terms thereof. 
Therefore, the provision in the contract 
providing for attorney's fees applies. 
(Emphasis added) 
If Plaintiffs were ever justified in naming ERA Realty 
Center as a separate Defendant, it had to be on the basis that 
ERA Realty Center was a party to the EarnPst Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement. If that is the case, then ERA 
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Realty Center, as a prevailing party, is entitled to its 
attorney's fees based on the language of the contract. 
IV. The Court erred in failing to award attorney's 
fees rendered on behalf of Defendant ERA Realty 
Center pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56. 
On or about May 5, 1982, Plaintiffs filed their Second 
Amended Complaint naming J. B. Deliran, a Utah corporation, 
Gerald House, and ERA Realty Center as Defendants. Plaintiffs' 
original Complaint also named ERA Realty Center as a Defendant. 
The prayer in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint requested 
relief for both damages as well as rescission, but they were 
not plead in the alternative. The importance of this argument 
is the fact that none of the six points in Plaintiffs' prayer 
for relief could be effectively granted against Defendant ERA 
Realty Center. Those six points are outlined above under the 
heading of Facts. 
It would have been theoretically impossible for the Court, 
either by judge or jury verdict, to enter a Judgment against 
ERA Realty Center for damages or rescission. If Plaintiffs had 
prevailed, Defendant ERA Realty Center would not have been 
obligated to refund to Plaintiffs the purchase price paid by 
them. Said Defendant would only have been required to refund 
to the seller the commission generated by reason of its efforts 
pursuant to the listing agreement. Certainly ERA Realty Center 
could not have been ordered to pay to Plaintiffs the money 
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received by Defendant J. fl. Del iran in the form of a down 
payment or for payments made by Plaintiffs on the contract of 
purchase. Furthermore, the Court correctly ruled as a matter 
of law that ERA Realty Center was the agent of J. 13. Deliran 
and the Court ultimately submitted to the jury for deliberation 
only the question of rescission (not damages) based on either 
mutual mistake of fact or fraud. The point is, therefore, that 
both theories could only apply to Defendant J. B. Deliran and 
not to Defendant ERA Realty Center. 
The pleadings clearly indicate that it has always been ERA 
Realty Center's position that it was not a proper party to this 
action primarily because Plaintiffs' Complaint had to rise or 
fall on the basis of the agency between ERA Realty Center and 
J. B. Deliran. However, Plaintiffs chose to join Defendant ERA 
Realty Center as a party-defendant. It is therefore Defendant 
ERA's position that Plaintiffs' claim was "without merit" and 
that Plaintiffs conduct in bringing this litigation was lacking 
in good faith, and by reason of the same, Defendant ERA Realty 
Center is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 18-27-56, 1953, as amended. See Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P. 2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the jury verdict which upheld the 
contract entered into between Plaintiffs ancl !Jcfend,1nt, to-wit, 
oc 
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the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement. The 
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling which denied the 
request of all Defendants for attorney's fees as the prevailing 
party, and remand the case to the Fifth Judicial District Court 
for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees to be 
awarded to said Defendants, including those incurred as part of 
the appeal process. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 1984. 
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